O mínimo existencial como pressuposto à intervenção do poder judiciário no controle de políticas públicas

Abstract

This work aimed to study the minimum existential assumption as to the intervention of the judiciary in public policy. The study involved the historical evolution of the theory of separation of powers, with the main references Locke and Montesquieu. We tried to the concept of human rights and freedoms, and the study and development of generations of rights. Emphasis was placed on fundamental social rights and their effectiveness in the face of existential minimum. With regard to public policy, traced the history of its emergence foreshortening, as well as examined the foundations of their control by the judiciary, ending with the constitutional foundations. Consequently, we started to look at the possibility of intervention in public policy by the judiciary as limits considering the reasonableness and reserve for examining, then the possibility of using the apparatus for such procedural intervention. Afterwards, we study the existential minimum on the lack of reserve for contingencies. The conclusion has been found to prove that the minimum corresponding to the existential core of each fundamental social right, analyzed in this case, the assumption is the intervention of the judiciary in control of public policies. The dialectical method was adopted for this study, which has the theoretical ideas of Ada Pellegrini Grinover.