A violação do dever de informação nos contratos de concessão de crédito e o superendividamento do consumidor

Abstract

This paper seeks to demonstrate the importance of complying with the duty to provide information in credit concession contracts, and how failure to comply with such obligation is capable of leading consumers to over-indebtedness. Outlines of the current consumer society are outlined, and in this context, how easy it is to obtain credit has prevented banks from adopting the necessary precautions to comply with the contract. Based on the analysis of specific cases of the granting of payroll loans and loans via credit card with a consignable margin reserve (RMC), it aims to demonstrate that banks have been taking advantage of the similarities between such loan modalities to induce consumers in error when contracting the most expensive modality, to then defend the impacts caused by the intentional omission of data essential to the loan agreement. Furthermore, it delimits the current legal treatment for over-indebted consumers, as well as the consequences of over-indebtedness, especially regarding the compromise of the right to the existential minimum.