Fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl e direito: caminhos e obstáculos

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to assess what obstacles are to be faced by the law researcher when using Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method. For such, three aspects related to these issues are exposed, namely: (i) the role phenomenologyplayed in the decline of positivism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, showing the questionsthat remainedunansweredby positivismand the answers presented, in contrast, by phenomenology; (ii) the contributions of phenomenology to the study of law, particularly regarding issues related tothe concept of law and the ruleinterpretation; (iii) the obstacles arising from the influence of phenomenology and the questionsthenensued, which need to be answeredfor the sake of development of legal science. As a conclusion, the main obstacles to be considered were thephenomenological method’s lack of transparency, the absence of verifiability regardingits results and thedifficulty in adaptingits premises to the mutability of the law as a social phenomenon.