A desvalorização do standard probatório na pronúncia do réu no tribunal do júri: uma análise sob o uso do princípio do in dubio pro societate

Abstract

This paper aims to critically analyze the application of the in dubio pro societate aphorism in the pronouncement phase of the Brazilian Jury Court, in light of the constitutional principles that govern criminal procedure. The research is based on the premise that, in judicial practice, doubts regarding the defendant’s authorship are often resolved against the accused, under the alleged justification of prioritizing the public interest over individual rights—even at the expense of the presumption of innocence and due process of law. The study adopts a qualitative methodology, grounded in bibliographic research and doctrinal and jurisprudential analysis, focusing on the evidentiary standard required for the pronouncement and the consequences of applying in dubio pro societate on judicial impartiality. By revisiting the historical evolution of the Jury Court, its bifurcated structure, and the judge’s role as a procedural filter, it is argued that the invocation of this aphorism—despite its widespread use—lacks normative basis and undermines the judicial control that should be exercised in the initial phase. Furthermore, such practice reveals traces of inquisitorial logic, allowing criminal prosecution to proceed even in the absence of sufficient evidentiary support. Ultimately, the study advocates for the abandonment of in dubio pro societate as a standard of admissibility and reaffirms the need for a criminal procedure model based on evidentiary rationality, well-founded decisions, and effective protection of fundamental rights