O falso reconhecimento de pessoa no processo penal: em que medida o show-up viola o princípio da presunção de inocência

Abstract

The functioning of human memory is limited by nature, so it cannot has the ability to preserve the past facts intact. the processing information is susceptible to internal distortions as well as interference external. Thus, it is certain that the memory-dependent proof is fallible from the point of view of epistemological point of view, being necessary, therefore, to adopt a procedure of production of evidence that does not neglect the studies of the psychology of testimony. Or That is, minimum standards for the reliability of the proof need to be adopted, since failure to observe a formal and rational process results in false recognitions, with the consequent conviction of the innocent. Among the forms to obtain evidence, the show-up is prominent in criminal justice, being a method of person recognition in which a single person is presented to the victim/witness to make the recognition, being, therefore, a procedure highly suggestive. That said, the present work intends to verify to what extent the use of show-up makes the constitutional principle of presumption of innocence is violated; In other words, we want to check whether a proof considered fragile and biased towards studies has the power to overcome the presumption of innocence for the conviction of the suspect, without, thus, constitutional precepts being violated